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Drafi Recommendation
on the operulional organisolian otWEU
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the fact that the United Kingdom has adopted as the main theme of its WEU Presidency
the development of the Organisation's operational capability and effectiveness;
(ii) Satisfied that the document " European security: a common concept of the27 WEU counEies 'o has
clearly spelled out not only the common interests of Europeans, the risks and potential threats, but also
Europe's new responsibilities in a post-cold war world;
(iii) Noting that the United States has made is sufficiently clear that there is no longer a guarantee that
it will intervene militarily in European regional crises;
(iv) Welcoming the conclusion of a security agreement betrveen WEU and NAIO on 6 May 1996 which
will greafly sfrengthen ties and improve working relations between the two organisations while contributing
to the enhancement of WEU's operational capabilities;
(v) Satisfred that an agreement has been reached in NAf,O on the implementation of CJTF, which is
vital for European-led operations without United States participation;
(vi) Regretting, however, that the solution now agreed to, with a European supported commander and a
US supporting commander, still leaves room for doubt as to the availability of NAf,O or US assets for
European-led operations at all times;
(vii) Aware that since the decisions made at the May 1995 meeting in Lisbon, the Politico-Military
Group and the Intelligence Section of the Planning Cell have become operational, while the Situation
Cenfre will be fully operational by June 1996;
(viii) Noting that the recent enlargement of the Planning Cell's staff will have no effect if too many
vacancies are left unoccupied;
(ix) Welcoming the fact that by June 1996, WEU will have established all the politico-military struc-
tures which will provide it with a comprehensive basic crisis-management system, including procedures
for force generation and assembly, and command and control mechanisms and that all the technology for
command, confrol and communications will be in place by the end of the year;
(x) Aware that, as a result of the progress made, WEU should be able to provide, by the end of 1996, a
sfrategic management structure for smaller-scale humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking;
(xi) Noting that the reconstruction effort in Bosnia, which was promised as part of the Dayton peace
agreement, has fallen badly behind schedule;
(xii) Noting that in view of the above, the crisis in Bosnia will not end on 20 December 1996, the expry
date of the IFOR presence, and that, as a consequence, preparations have to be made for a continued
peacekeeping presence, whatever its form, after that date;
(xiii) Aware that the WEf,J Planning Cell is developing a coherent WEU exercise programme extending
to the year 2000 to develop progressively FAWEU's operational capabilities in implementing the above-
mentioned tasks;
(-uv) Considering that WEU's operational capabilities should enable it to undertake the full range of
Petersberg tasks, but stressing at the same time that these capabilities should eventually also enable it to
perforrr its basic task of mutual defence as stipulated in the modified Brussels Treaty;
(n) Welcoming the Council's efforts to facilitate participation in WEU operations by observer nations,
and to involve associate partners more fully in the work on WEU's operational role;
(ni) Aware, however, that a clear distinction between members and associate members on the one hand
and non-NAIO observeps and associate parmers on the other, must inevitably be maintaiqed in order tq
ensur€ the closest possible links with NAIO, which are crucial for the development of WEU's operational
capability;
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(nii) Welcoming the frst results of the WEU Srategic Mobility Study which should enable it to establish
coordination measures and procedures for the pooling of national fiansport assets, but convinced that early
decisions are needed to go atread with the further development of the Future Large Aircraft, in order to
rejuvenate Europe's ageing military transport fleet in good time;
(niii) Convinced that a serious discussion on the role and funrre of nuclear weapons in Europe's security
and defence policy cannot be postponed much longer,
RecopflvcNDs rrlAr rrn CouNct-
l. Continue to enhance the operational capabilities of WEU in order to ensure that eventually WEU
will also be able to conduct larger-scale operations at higher levels of conflict;
2. Start preparations at an early stage in order to extend, for as long as necessary, IFOR's mandate in
Bosnia, making use, if need be, of the possibilities offered by combined joint task forces (CJTF);
3. Continue to make an energetic effort to give strategic mobility a high priority, not only by asking
the WEU Srategic Mobility Study Group to continue its work, but also by promoting the fuither devel-
opment and early commissioning of a future large aircraft;
4. Reinforce the Planning Cell qualitatively and quantitatively for the purpose of preparing the pos-
sible deployment of FAWEU in order to ensure that WEU's operational role can be fully developed;
5. Ensure that the strengthening of WEU's operational capabilities are continued and improved, espec-
ially in the field of standardisation and interoperability;
6. Engage in a debate on a European defence possibly consolidated by concerted deterrence, initially
by establishing a strategic study group within WEU:
- 
to examine the role and future of nuclear weapons for European security including the different
aspects of intra-European extended nuclear deterrence;
- 
to examine the role all the WEU member states might play in defining a future European nuclear
strategy;
- 
to study the possibility of creating a nuclear coordination body within WEU;
as was recommended previously in Recommendations 564 and 590, and:
- 
to consider whether European nuclear forces should be closely linked with NATO's nuclear cap-
abilities, and especially those of the United States;
- 
to analyse effective means of cooperation between a WEU nuclear coordination body and
NAIO's Nuclear Planning Group;
7 . Make clear that if European security architecture, including a common defence, is to be cohesive, it
requires a process leading to congruence between European organisations such as WEU, the EU 
- 
or its
CFSP 
- 
and the European part of NAIO.
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Explanatory Memorandum
gubmiaed by Mr Schlaten, Rtpporteur)
I.Introd.uction
1. Since the Petersberg Declaration, WEU has
seriously started to improve and enhance is oper-
ational capabilities. Indeed, it makes no sense talk-
ing about a European defence identity and the
" defence arm " of the European Union, if WEU
lacks the operational capabilities which should
enable it to mount and control a military operation.
2. Compared to what was indeed a very
modest start, much has been accomplished since
1991 and, at present, WEU is expected to have a
full operational capability with the required poli-
tico-military infrastructure in June 1996.
3. Why worry about WEU's operational cap-
abilities? The United Kingdom's Foreign Secre-
tary and Chairman of the WEU Council struck the
right chord when he said:
" We need to make better use of WEU.
Regrettably, so far the debate about WEU
has been too abstract, too little related to
the realities of military life. I want to
change this. European countries need to
have the option to act if our North Ameri-
can Allies choose not to participate in peace-
keeping, humanitarian or crisis-manage-
ment operations. WEU is the vehicle for
this, working with NAIO, not competing
with it. Making WEU more operational is
the key priority for the United Kingdom
Presidency between now and June. We
want to make the Western European Union
an organisation which works.
This will not be easy. Anybody can draft
some ringing declarations about European
defence. The real challenge is to develop
the structures to allow us to deploy our
forces quickly and effectively; to find ways
to use NATO assets rather than duplicating
them; to ensure satisfactory systems of
command and control.
Success will require closer collaboration
between WEU and the European Union.
John Major put forward specific proposals
last spring which would enable the two
organisations to work increasingly closely
together 
- 
for example through holding
back-to-back summits. ffis is a practical
response to a practical problem'or.
l. Address at the Institut Frangais des Relations lnternatio-
nales, Paris,5 March 1996.
Indeed, it seems that after so many abstract and
institutional debates, also in preparing the intergov-
emmental conference, the time has come for a
down-to-earth practical approach to solve the
shortcomings of WEU.
4. Moreover, the states participating in WEU
know full well that the development of operatio-
nal capabilities for WEU is not a theoretical acti-
vity. The situation in Bosnia hovers in the back-
ground of almost every single security discussion
in Europe.
5. At present, the sinration in Bosnia with the
presence of 60 000 IFOR troops, is relatively
quiet, but this may change rapidly after the with-
drawal of IFOR. A recent report of the United
States Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the
prospects for a viable unitary Bosnia beyond the
life of IFOR deployment were'o dim " without a
large international programme to revive Bosnia's
economy. This international civilian reconstruc-
tion programme has only just started with sub-
stantial promises for financial assistance having
been decided at a Brussels meeting as late as April
1996. According to the abovementioned report,
the strategic goals of the warring factions in the
region have not fundamentally changed since the
war that ended with the Dayton Accords, and ten-
sions may grow further as the deadline for IFOR's
withdrawal draws nearer2.
6. Although not one of the states participating
in IFOR wishes to talk about it openly, all concern-
ed are well aware that after 20 December 1996,
the date of expiry of IFOR's mandate when Uni-
ted States froops will start withdrawing from Bos-
nian territory there may be the huge problem of
Bosnia not having sufficiently normalised its
situation to be able to live without protection from
foreign Eoops. In that evento the European allies
will have to make the choice of whether they
leave together with the United States troops or
stay, literally in order to keep the peace 
- 
an oper-
ation which would certainly require a consid-
erable deployment of troops, weaponry and other
equipment, support and logistics.
7. The main question to be solved at short
notice is indeed whether, and under what circum-
stances, the Europeans will be able to conduct a
serious peacekeeping operation on European ter-
ritory without the active participation of the Amer-
lcans.
2. International Herald Tribunz,2l Match 1996.
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8. Five years after the treaty on European
Union was signed, triumphantly announcing a
bright and secure future for an integrated Europe,
Europeans may have to demonstrate that these
were not empty words. HopefuIly, the Berlin meet-
ing of the North Atlantic Council will by then
have given the gteen light for implementation of
the CJTF concept, which should enable NATO
and in particular European member states, to
employ NAf,O logistics and other assets in a mili-
tary operation even if the United States preferred
not to participate.
9. With all the politico-military and support
structures established, one can hardly imagine
that Western European states will renounce their
responsibilities for peace and security in Europe.
10. If Europe is convinced that the internatio-
nal community cannot leave Bosnia to its own
fate, then it should make preparations to stay. It
has enough troops and resources to do so. At the
moment, it has not yet made up its mind. There
are still six months left.
11. Indeed, ifEuropedidnotinterveneinanew
crisis in Bosnia, it would most probably lose its
credibility in foreign and security matters for a
long time to come.
II. Recent WEU operations
12. Recent crises and conflicts have provided
WEU and its member states with various opportu-
nities to test their capabilities in military or com-
bined civilian-military operations.
13. In 1987-88, after the Iran-Iraq war, Bel-
gium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the Uni-
ted Kingdom conducted a joint mine-clearance
operationcodenamed " Cleansweep " to help with
the clearance of a 300-mile sea lane in the Srait of
Hormuz. This operation, with its coordination
mechanisms approved by the nine WEU member
states, heightened awareness of their capability to
conduct joint operations.
14. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August
1990, the WEU Council decided to coordinate
possible operations in that area, emphasising that
coordination within WEU could facilitate coop-
eration with the forces of other countries in the
region. However, due to the absence of a WEU
staff headquarters or even an experienced plan-
ning staff, few practical decisions emerged. This
experience also showed that there is a requirement
foi speed in reacting to such crises, making out a
strong argurnent in favour of appropriate penna-
nent structures.
15. In July 1992, maritime forces operating
under WEU and NATO and working in strict
coordination, started monitoring compliance with
United Nations Security Council sanctions
against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. Later,
on 8 June 1993, aconcept of combined operations
for the implementation of Security Council Reso-
lution 820 was approved by the Councils of WEU
and NAIO. Under the codename " Sharp Guard ",
a unified command was established with the
WEU and NATO Councils exerting joint political
control. The Council's guidelines were translated
into military instructions through the appropriate
bodies of the two organisations, cooperating
within a joint ad hoc headquarters, MILCOM
Adriatic.
16. The resulting combined operation started
on 15 June 1993 with the mission to conduct oper-
ations to monitor and enforce compliance with
United Nations sanctions in accordance with Uni-
ted Nations Security Council Resolutions 713,
757,787 and 820.
17. The WEU force consisted of the following
naval elements:
- 
five ships under the command of the
Commander of WEU maritime forces;
- 
one French AWACS aircraft;
- 
six maritime patrol aircraft;
- 
Italian aircraft and helicopters.
18. Italy also provided, at national level, two
vessels for surveillance operations in the Adriatic,
one frigate for the surveillance of fishing vesselso
coastal patrol boats and vessel inspection teams;
eight fighter aircraft were also available on
standby. United Kingdom and United States
forces provided round-the-clock support to these
forces. A WEU staff unit of three officers opera-
ted in the Headquarters Naval Forces Southern
Europe (COMNAVSOUTH). Since 23 November
1995, Operation Sharp Guard has been readjusted
in accordance with United Nations Security
Council Resolutions I02l and 1022.
19. At about the same time, WEU mounted a
police and customs operation on the Danube to
help Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania control the
implementation of the weapons embargo and the
economic sanctions against Serbia and Monte-
negro. This mission comprised some 240 agents
from seven member states, with control points
having seven patrol vessels at their disposal.
lmplementation of the economic sanctions against
Serbia and Montenegro has been suspended since
23 November 1995, in accordance with United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1021 and
t022.
20. At the request of the European Union for a
contribution to a future European Union adminis-
tration in Mostar, member states made individual
contributions to a WEU police contingent, which
is considered crucial for restoring public order
and building confidence between the Croat and
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Muslim pafis of the city. In addition to the conffi-
butions from WEU member states, there were
also contributions from Austri4 Finland and Swe-
den to the WEU police contingent. Around 180
WEU police officials are now active in Mostar. It
should be noted that they do not carry arms and
that they have no powers of arrest. The unification
of the local Croat and Muslim police forces,
which is the objective of the operation, has not
been a great success until now, mainly because of
continuing resistance from the Croat side.
I I I. Improving operational capabilities
2I. The Assembly adopted a number of recom-
mendations, in particular after the Petersberg
Declaration, regarding the improvement of
WEU's operational capabilities.
22. Initially, the Council was still struggling
with the consequences of the transfer of both the
Council and the Secretariat-General from London
to Brussels and the establishment of the Planning
Cell. At the same time, the rapidly deteriorating
situation in former Yugoslavia and the building of
a good working relationship with the central
European states in particular, required a $eat deal
of attention.
23. Nevertheless, the Council agreed with the
Assembly that an improvement in WEU's oper-
ational capabilities was vital for the eventual
implementation of Petersberg tasks. Recent oper-
ations, even if most of them were conducted suc-
cessfully, had revealed shortcomings requiring
the Organisation to adapt. The Council has clearly
given its opinion on this subject in a number of
recent declarations.
24. In their Noordwijk Declaration of 14
November l994,the WEU Ministers " underlined
the importance of developing further the operatio-
nal role of WEU in accordance with the Peters-
berg Declaration and the operational considera-
tions of the Document on a Common European
Defence Policy ".
25. In the preliminary conclusions on the form-
ulation of a common European defence policy,
adopted by the Council on 14 November 1994, it
was recognised that o'WEIJ will need appropriate
mechanisms for political decision-making and
military command and conEol ".
26. The preliminary conclusions then cont-
inued, painting a full picture of what structures
WEU needed in the fields of decision-making,
command and control. It was said that:
" The Council needs to have appropriate
information and consultation mechanisms
and procedures and more support, in parti-
cular to enable prompt reactions to crises,
inter alia through a politico-military work-
ing group in Brussels which can be reinfor-
ced as necessary according to the specific
nature of the contingency. The support
capacities of the Secretariat in the politico-
military field need to be reinforced accor-
dingly so that the Secretariat can fully sup-
port the work done by the Council and its
politico-military working group. The
Secretariat and Planning Cell need to be
complemented by capacities in the area of
intelligence and crisis management in order
to fulfil the tasks mandated by the Peters-
berg Declaration: for instance, a situation
centre and an intelligence section, which
are already under study. The tasks of the
Military Delegates in support of the Chiefs
of Defence Staff as well as the members of
the Council also need to be defined more
clearly in this context.
During operations, WEU command and
control structures and arrangements will
have to allow for the use by WEU of col-
lective assets and capabilities made avail-
able by the Alliance and for the use of
national assets of non-WEU members, as
well as for the participation of non-WEU
nations in WEU operations, where appro-
priate. WEU should aim at the highest pos-
sible degree of multinationality at all levels
of the command chain, particularly at the
level of force and operations headquarters.
Multinational headquarters should be avail-
able for use by both WEU and NAIO. At
the level of force headquarters, the conse-
quences of the CJTF concept are already
under consideration. A similar approach to
multinationality should be developed for
operations headquarters. "
27. It was further stated that participation in a
specific operation is and will remain based on a
sovereign decision of each member state.
28. What has been accomplished since Novem-
ber 1994?
29. On 15 May 1995, the Council, meeting in
Lisbon, approved a decision which inter alia:
" provides WEU with new decision-
making mechanisms and structures, in par-
ticular the establishment of a new politico-
military group in support of the Council, a
Situation Centre, and an Intelligence Sec-
tion in the Planning Cell. "
30. On 14 November 1995 in Madrid, the
Council o'took note of and welcomed the Secre-
tary-General's study on the Sifuation Centre and
the Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell, as
well as the preparatory measures for its imple-
mentation, such as the setting-up of a project
team, and the necessary budgetary provisions ". It
further looked forward to the establishment of the
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Sinration Cenffe and to it being fully operational
in time for Phase tr of WEU Crisex 95-96.
31. In the document on o'European security: a
common concept of the 27 WEU countries ",
approved by the WEU Council on 14 November, a
large section is devoted to a discussion of the gaps
and deficiencies in European capabilities and pos-
sible responses to enhance these capabilities.
32. In particular, the document identifies gaps
and deficiencies in the following areas:
(i) crisis-management mechanisms,
including procedures for force genera-
tion and assembly, and command and
control procedures;
(ii) reconnaissance and intelligence;
(iii) sfrategic and in-theatre transport cap-
abilities;
(iv) standardisation and interoperability;
(v) the European defence indusfial base.
33. The present report will in particular discuss
the capabilities mentioned under item (i) and brief-
ly mehtion some of the activities undertaken in
other fields, especially those mentioned under
items (ii) and(iii).
34. Drawing lessons from experience in the
conflict in formerYugoslavi4 the common concept
makes a number of specific recommendations.
35. In general, the concept recommends among
other things that:
- 
the political aims of the mission must be
set out clearly from the start; the mission
should be reviewed continually to ensure
that tasks are not gradually taken on in
theatre which deviate from the overall
political aim;
- 
adequate capabilities and an effective
decision-making structure to undertake
the Petersberg tasks must be available to
WEU;
- 
WEU needs to develop mechanisms for
close consultation with the European
Union on both political and operational
matters. This will be particularly impor-
tant for WEU missions of humanitarian
assistance and reconstruction which, as in
Mostaro are likely to involve overall poli-
tical guidance by the European Union, if
not actual participation by civilian agen-
cies coordinated by the European Union.
36. In operational terms, the concept states that
WEU's cafabilities should be enhanced in the fol-
lowing fields:
- 
there must be a clear channel of commu-
nication between the WEU Council and
WEU forces. Experience indicates that,
besides the role of liaison played thus far
by the WEU Presidency, there needs to
be a proper channel of communication
linking WEU elements involved in an
operation with the WEU Council;
- 
for each WEU operation, there must be a
single chain of command for all WEU
military forces involved, in order to
avoid confusion and delay in carrying
out tasks;
- 
arrangements need to be devised for
ensuring efficient coordination in the
theaffe of operations between the miti-
tary and civilian elements of an opera-
tion, in particular where the civilian ele-
ments are provided bY another
organisation, such as the United Nations;
- 
the need for WEU to establish or have
access to an adequate observation cap-
ability and to dev.elop an.intelligence-
processing capability, which are decisive
for the conduct of operations in complex,
shifting politico-military environments ;
- 
the need to have transport capabilities
available permitting the rapid projection
of forces and their deployment to the
theatre of operation as required.
37. In the following chapters, the various
issues at stake will be discussed separately.
fV Which Petercberg operatians?
38. In the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June
1992,it was stated that:
" Apart from contributing to the conmon
defence in accordance with Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty and Article V of the
modified Brussels Treaty respectively,
military units of WEU member states,
acting under the authority of WEU, could
be employed for:
- 
humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- 
peacekeeping tasks;
- 
tasks of combat forces in crisis manage-
ment, including peacemaking. "
39. Although since then the WEU member
states have never revoked this inventory ofPeters-
berg tasks, they understand that it would be a tall
ordEr for WEU to implement the full range of
tasks in the near future, particularly because of the
Organisation's limited operational capabilities. At
the same time, it is to be noted that it has become
cofllmon usage to label only those three tasks
mentioned at the end of the preceding paragraph
as Petersberg tasks. The beginning of the para-
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graph states clearly, however, that military units
of WEU member states, acting under the authority
of WEU, also contribute to the co[lmon defence
in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels
Treaty. In general, however, it is assumed that the
common defence of allied territory is the primary
task of NATO.
40. It can be noted that in recent years the
Council has not always followed a logical or
consistent line of thought as regards its priorities
in the implementation of Petersberg tasks. On the
other hand, it has to be admitted that the course of
events in former Yugoslavia may have helped to
assess the serious problems connected with peace-
keeping, crisis management and peacemaking.
4I. In the Luxembourg Declaration of
November 1993, Ministers were still requesting
" that work on planning for the tasks defined in
the Petersberg Declaration be continued, espe-
cially on peacekeeping and crisis management,
including peacemaking ". The Planning Cell was
tasked, in completing the list of FAWEU (forces
answerable to WEU) incorporating national
inputs, with identifying forces especially suited
for humanitarian tasks.
42. The Kirchberg Declaration of 9 May 1994
mentioned that:
" Ministers noted the work of the Planning
Cell on the forces answerable to WEU, and
requested it to develop further an inventory
of force packages which will enable WEU
to carry out the tasks conferred to it, parti-
cularly in the field of humanitarian mis-
sions, peacekeeping and crisis manage-
ment. They also took note of the report of
the role of WEU in peacekeeping."
43. h 1994, the Planning Cell started to pre-
pare a strawman paper on the operational aspects
of the third Petersberg mission, following the
same structures as for the existing humanitarian
and peacekeeping documents. The final paper
defined the possible " missions of combat forces
in crisis management, including peacemaking ".
In that document, " peacemaking " was under-
stood in the sense ofthe general concept ofpeace
enforcement in the context of peace operations.
4. In the Noordwijk Declaration of 14
November 1994, however, the Council stated that
in the Planning Cell's tasks " priority should be
given to the development of appropriate plans and
procedures for humanitarian and rescue oper-
ations, including evacuation operations ". Appar-
ently, the third Petersberg task of combat forCes in
crisis management had become less urgent and
may have been considered over-ambitious in the
light of the conclusions of the abovementioned
Planning Cell document.
45. On 15 May 1995, the WEU Council took
note of documents on "'WELJ'S role in evacuation
operations ". At the same time, the Council endors-
ed a document on " emergency responses to
humanitarian crises: a role for a WEUhumanita-
rian task force ", which was based on an Ital-
ian/United Kingdom proposal on the principles
and arrangements for establishing a WEU human-
itarian task force and on the use of military assets
in humanitarian crises. The Permanent Council
was asked to complete its work on this subject as
a priority while the Planning Cell was requested
to take forward its generic planning in this area as
a matter of urgency.
46. In Recommendation 5663, the Assembly
had asked the Council to:
" Actively support the creation of a multi-
national African peacekeeping force which
should be able to act rapidly under a United
Nations mandate, by encouraging WEU
member states to preposition equipment on
the African continent and to take responsi-
bility to train African units for such tasks; "
47. In its replya, the Council stated that this
issue would be " included in due time on the
Council's agend4 taking into account other reflec-
trgns on that subject, namely in the European
Union and in the Organisation of African Unity ".
48. Only a few months later, in the Lisbon
Declaration of 15 May 1995:
" Ministers also marked their interest in the
initiative by France and the United King-
dom on peacekeeping and conflict-preven-
tion in Africa. In this connection, they wel-
comed the preliminary reflections taking
place in WEU in parallel with the discus-
sions within the European Union and
against the background of the debate in
progress at the United Nations; they in-
structed the Permanent Council to take for-
ward its reflections on this subject. "
49. Finally, meeting in Madrid on 14 Novem-
ber 1995:
oo Ministers endorsed the document " Steps
to take in implementing an operation of a
WEU Humanitarian Task Force (Part tr) "
and welcomed the significant work in
WEU since the adoption of documents in
Noordwijk and Lisbon on WEU Humanita-
rian Missions and Emergency Responses to
Humaniurian Crises. "
Ministers further stated that:
" These documents will provide a frame-
work for effective use of a WEU Humani-
tarian Task Force for WEU operations. It
3. Adopted on 29 Novembet 1994.
{. Qerunnnig4fsd to the Assembly on 27 February 1995.
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will also allow WEU to contribute to efforts
of other International Organisations in
Humanitarian and Emergency Relief Oper-
ations. Ministers requested the Permanent
Council to ensure that the Planning Cell
take forward as a matter of priority its gen-
eric planning in this area."
50. The United Kingdom, at the start of its pres-
idency of WEU in January 1996, planned to use
WEU's experience in peacekeeping to help Afri-
can nations build up an indigenous capacity to
carry out peacekeeping operations themselves.
fnis initiaiive, however, seems to have received
only a lukewarm response and at present politico-
military discussioni are still continuing on the
question of whether this is feasible at all.
51. The possible establishment of a standing
humanitarian task force was originally proposed
in July 1994 by the Italian Government in both
WEU and NATO. NATO reacted with a reference
to the future implementation of the CJTF concep.
tn WEU, as mentioned earlier, documents on this
subject were endorsed by the Ministerial Council
at its Lisbon and Madrid meetings. A number of
member states, among others Germany,Italy, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, are not in
favour of establishing a standing humanitarian
task force, but there is growing consensus on pro-
cedures to provide troops and equipment for an ad
hoc task folce. The Planning Cell is now drafting
criteria and procedures aimed at the rapid compo_-
sition and deployment of a humanitarian task
force in emeigeircies, based on preconceived
force packages. ln response to a British initiative,
the Cliiefs oT Defence staff met on 18 April 1996
to discuss crisis management, in particularhuman-
itarian aid operations.
52. When taking over the presidency of WEU,
the United Kingdom announced as one of its main
objectives thal WEU should have the ability to-
peiform " lighter Petersberg tasks by the end of
1996'. Under the present circumstances, most
WEU member statea agtee that WEU should first
concenEate on the lower end of the spectrum of
Petersberg operations, in particular humanitarian
missions and evacuation operations.
53. At the same time, it is thought that develop-
ments in the Balkans will oblige WEU to prepare
for peacekeeping missions. Given existing__caP-
abilities, it seems realistic to admit that WEU
would have ffouble in carrying out combat mis-
sions in crisis management, including peace-
making. On the other hand, givel the text of
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and the
increasing reluctance of the United States to inter-
vene militarily in crises on European territory,
such tasks cannot be excluded.
54. Although it is not easy to assess the num-
bers of armed forces that might be involved in
possible WEU operations, it should be undqsood
that the lighter Petersberg operations will only
involve limited numbers of troops. This is unders-
tandable given WEUos as yet modest planning
capability. SHAPE, with its planning staff_, took
more than ayear to draft plans for the 60 @0-toop
operation inBosnia, now being conductedby IFOR.
Ifwas recenfly suggested ttratimplementation of the
CJTF concept, to be endorsed by the Norttr Atlantic
Council in Berlin in June 1996, would allow for
European-led medium-sized operations.
V The WEU Planning Cell
55. At Petersberg it was also decided to estab-
lish a Planning CeIl as from October 1992 wirh
the following three main tasks:
- 
keeping an updated list of units and com-
binations of units which would be alloca-
ted to WEU for specific oPerations;
- 
preparing contingency plans for deploy-
ment of forces under WEU ausPices;
- 
preparing recommendations for the
necessary command, control and com-
munication arrangements, including
standing operating procedures for head-
quarters which might be selected.
56. The newly-appointed director and a limited
number of staff members did indeed start pre-
paring the work of the Planning Cell in temporary
premises in October 1992.The Planning Cell then
moved to its permanent premises within WEU
headquarters in June 1993 and was declared_frtlly
operational on I April 1994. The Defence Com-
niittee, attaching geat importance to the work of
the Planning Cell, adopted a report on this subject
in May 1994s.
57. InJune l994,theAssembly adoptedanum-
ber of recommendations with the primary objec-
tive of enabling the Planning Cell to concentrate
on tasks which were considered to be vital at that
time6. In its reply to Recommendation 561', the
Council assured the Assembly that it would
enable the Planning Cell to focus its activities on
ttre three main tasks as formulated in the Peters-
berg Declaration.
58. At the time of witing this report, it can be
concluded that much progress has been made as
regards the flrst of the three main tasks.
59. The Planning Cell has at its disposal a full
and updated list of units and combinations of units
which would be allocated to WEU for specific
5. See Document l42l: ,, The WEU planning Cell ", report
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mn Baar-
veld-Schlaman, Rapporteur.
6. Recommendation 561, adopted on 15 June 1994.
7. Communicated to the Assembly on 26 October 1994.
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operations 
- 
the forces answerable to WEU(FAWEU). A separate list includes units which
associate members, associate partners and obser-
vers consider suitable for such operationst.
60. Implementation of the second task, prepar-
i-ng contingency plans for the deployment of
forces under WEU auspices, was initially discus-
sed at great length in the Permanent Council. As a
result of these discussionso the Planning Cell is to
develop generic plans for possible operations
where some of the planning factors have not yet
been fully identified or cannot be assumed. They
include the identification of typical force pack-
ages for such operations. At the Council's request,
the Planning Cell will draw up contingency plans
for possible operations in cases wheie ttre plan-
ning factors have been idenffied or can be assu-
med. As soon as the Council decides to mount a
specific operation, it will designate an Operations
Commander, who is responsible for drafting an
operations plan normally in cooperation with the
Planning Cell and based on earlier generic and
contingency plans. Generic planning for humani-
tarian crises, including a full array of force pack-
ages, has now been completed. Existing generic
planning can be taken off the shelf in order to
update it, but the Planning Cell is not allowed to
do any formal contingency planning without
having been mandated by the Council.
61. The Planning Cell is also implementing its
third and probably most complicated task because
of the large number of different potitical and mili-
tary authorities involved. Most of the basic work
in the fields of command, conffol and communi-
cations arrangements, and operating procedures
l_o1 the headquarters have now been completed.
When the Situation Centre becomes operatibnal at
the end of June 1996, WEU will have a full poli-
tico-military infrastructure at its disposal.-The
only basic decision still to be taken by the Coun-
cil concerns who will serve as the point of contact
between the Council and the operational com-
mander of a WEU operation. Until now, the nomi-
nation of a point of contact has been an ad hoc
decision, depending on the circumstances, mostly
based on a choice between a representative of the
Presidency of WEU and the Director of the Plan-
ning Cell. It would seem appropriate, however, to
decide that for all operations, the Director of the
Planning Cell should be the point of contact. The
Planning Cell Director would have the advantage
of being familiar with earlier generic and contin-
gency planning for WEU operations, including
force packages. The lisr of FAWEU is drafted
under his responsibility. He is used to working
with the headquarters of national armed forcei
and has inside knowledge of a1l WEU procedures
and the futl Planning Cell staff at his command.
The different elements of this infrastructure will
be discussed in chapter VtrI of the present report.
62. In fact, the frustrations that came to light in
the early days of the Planning Cell's exisience,
pany 9f which were due to teething problems,
have disappeared. The staffare no longel in doubt
over their tasks and responsibilities and, in
contacts with other organisations, suspicions have
disappeared and have been replaced by good work-
ing-relation!. The total number of ihe Planning
Cell's staff, including the staff of the Intelligence
Section, has been increased to 54, which is consid-
ered sufficient for the work to be done. It com-
par-e_s y_iqh SACEUR's reaction force planning
staff of 50, which was sufficienr to play ils part in
organising IFOR planqing. The only' remlaining
practical problem is that member states some-
times have trouble in agreeing on the staffposts to
be filled. In March 1996, there were six vacancies
in the Planning Cell's staff.
63. As a result of direct contacts with national
defence ministries, discussions with the military
delegates and through the WEUCOM networli,
good cooperation between national capitals and
the Planning Cell has now been established.
@. Tlvo associate member states, Norway and
Tirrkey, have nominated officers to the Planning
Cell.
65. An Automated Data Processing Plan has
been drawn up in the Planning Cell and the Secre-
tariat-General and has now been implementede.
This plan will most probably be appioved in the
very-near future and installation of the equipment
needed to implement the plan is expected tb take
place before the end of 1996.
VI. Forces answerable ta WEU (FAWEU)
66. The concept of forces answerable to WEU(FAWEU) was established in the Petersberg
Declaration of 19 June 1992:
" WEIJ member states declare that they are
prepared to make available military irnits
from the whole spectrum of their c-onven-
tional armed forces for military tasks
conducted under the authority of WEU.
Decisions to use military units answerable
to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council
in accordance with the provisions of the
United Nations Charter. Participation in
specific operations will remain a iovereign
decision of member states in accordance
with national constitutions.
Military units will be drawn from the forces
of WEU member states, including forces
8. See also the Reply of the Council to Recommendation 566,
communicated to the Assembly on27 February 1995.
9. See also the Reply of the Council to Recommendation 561,
communicated to the Assembly on26 October 1994.
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with NATO missions 
- 
in this case after
consultation with NATO 
- 
and will be org-
anised on a multinational and multi-service
basis.
All WEU member states will soon desig-
nate which of their military units and head-
quarters they would be willing to make
available to WEU for its various possible
tasks. Where multinational formations
drawn from the forces of WEU nations
already exist or are planned, these units
could be made available for use under the
authority of WEU, with the agreement of
all participating nations. "
67. The existence of FAWEU counteracts the
long-standing argument used by many critics of
WEU as an operational organisation that WEU
has no froops to be deployed for a military opera-
tion.
68. On 22 November 1993, WEU approved a
report on relations between forces answerable to
WEU which established two different categories
of FAWEU:
" 
- 
national FAWEU, military units and
headquarters designated by states
which can be made available to carry
out tasks conducted under the authority
of WEU;
" 
- 
multinational FAWEU, established
multinational military units and head-
quarters, existing and future, jointly
designated for the same purpose by the
participating states. "
69. The word " answerable " suggests a rather
strong institutional and hierarchical link between
such units and WEU, but this should be interpret-
ed as o' at the disposal of WEU " or o' available on
demand o' and not " assigned to ", as is the case in
NATO with the national armed forces of its mem-
ber states.
70. The Planning Cell recently finished its
1996 annual update of forces answerable to WEU(FAWEU), comprising one list specifying the
forces of member states, associate member states
and observers, and a separate list referring to the
forces proposed by the associate partners. The
FAWEU lists were used in the WEU Crisex 95-96
exercise and, according to the Planning Cell, they
clearly passed the test. Over 2000 units have now
been made available to WEU ranglng from ship,
battalion and air squadrons to larger units.
71. At its Madrid meeting on 14 November
1995, the Council endorsed the document on
the " Creation and Assembly of Forces for WEU
Operations " which defines the mechanisms and
procedures for the creation and assembly of a WEU
force in times of crisis to conduct a Petersberg mis-
sion, providing WEU with a useful tool for the
rational exploitation of operational capabilities
built on assets to be drawn from the FAWEU list.
72. In March 1996, the French Prime Minister,
Alain Jupp6, addressing a meeting of European
conservative parties, suggested that five major
European countries could between them put sub-
stantial numbers of ftoops at the disposal of the
European Union, and come up with the means
necessary for this force. The European Union
would then have a force of 250 000 to 350 000
men managed by WEU and serving under an
appropriate command which could act either
autonomously or in liaison with the forces of the
United States in the framework of a NATO opera-
tion. Mr Jupp6's proposal was not received with
any enthusiasm in other European Union member
states and no official reaction was given.
73. Unofficially, it was said that NATO would
be happier to see the European allies able to
deploy 30 000 to 40 000 troops together, rather
than speak in terms of a European army proper. [n
Germany, it was noted that a German contribution
of around 50 000 troops was very unlikely given
an earlier statement by the Defence Ministry that
it would make no more than 12 000 troops avail-
able for operations outside the NAIO area.
74. Recently, however, in an interviewro, the
German Defence Minister categorically rejected
Mr Jupp6's suggestion, arguing that a European
anny was out of the question because it would
destroy transatlantic relations. He added that Ger-
many wanted a development within NAIO struc-
tures, creating flexibility and an operational cap-
ability for Europe, which took France into
account, and that he did not want to duplicate
NATO or compete with it.
VII. Cooperatian between the WEU
Plnnning Cell and multinatianal FAWEU
(Forces answerable to WEU)
75. After the establishment of the European
Corps in 1992, the participating states 
- 
Belgium,
France and Germany 
- 
adopted a " Joint Declara-
tion stating the conditions for the use of the Euro-
pean Corps in the framework of Western Euro-
pean Union " which was also endorsed by both
Spain and Luxembourg when they formally
became participants.
76. This Joint Declaration envisaged close
cooperation between the European Corps and the
WEU Planning Cell, stipulating that the Com-
mander of the European Corps would keep the
Planning Cell regularly informed about issues
such as the manpower, equipment and weapons of
the corps units that might act in WEU operations,
the assets and infrastructure to be used for logistic
11
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support, training objectives and exercise pro-
grarnmes, and operational capability. It was fur-
ther stipulated that the Planning Cell Director
would inform the states participating in the Euro-
pean Corps of his assessment and proposals regard-
ing the raining of units, preparation and conduct
of exercises, organisation of communications and
logistic support and operability.
77. Meanwhile, after an initial phase in which
both sides sounded out each other's position, a
good working relationship has been established.
This is also demonstrated by the success of WEU
Crisex 95-96, Phase I, carried out in December
1995 in close cooperation with the European
Corps, which was declared fully operational on 30
November 1995.
78. Thedefinitionofandarangementforaperm-
anent liaison between the European Corps and the
WEU Planning Cell have now been incorporated
in a Memorandum of Understanding agreed by the
Council on 7 May 1996.
79. ln l994,joint declarations were adopted
setting out the conditions for use of the
B elgian/German/Netherlands/United Kingdom
multinational division (Central) and the United
Kingdom/Netherlands amphibious force in the
framework of WEU, together with the relevant
arrangements. On 14 November 1995, the WEU
Council endorsed the adoption of similar joint
declarations for the use of EUROFOR and
EIJROMARFOR in the framework of WEU.
80. MOUs for these four multinational forces
have been drafted and were to be adopted by the
Council on 7 May 1996. They are similar to the
abovementioned MOU establishing a permanent
liaison between the WEU Planning CeIl and the
European Corps. Basically, the MOUs are inten-
ded to provide the Planning Cell with detailed
advice and information for drawing up generic
planning, one of its main tasks.
81. In March 1996, Germany and the Nether-
lands agreed to declare the German-Netherlands
army corps as FAWEU. It is expected that the
Joint Declaration will be signed in the near futureo
followed by a MOU similar to those mentioned
above.
VI I I. Politiro-military infrastructure,
commandand control
82. Much of the criticism regarding WEU as an
operational organisation has always focused on
the argument that it did not have the adequate
politico-military structures for command and
confiol over a military operation.
83. The Council, well aware of this significant
shortcoming in the Organisation, has slowly but
steadily worked to fill this gap and the full poli-
tico-military infrastructure has now been put into
place.
84. The Petersberg Declaration confirmed the
authority of the WEU Council to take decisions
for WEU to deploy military forces, but indicated
at the same time that the actual forces would
always be provided by a " coalition of the
willing ", when it said:
oo Decisions to use military units answer-
able to WEU will be taken by the WEU
Council in accordance with the provisions
of the United Nations Charter. Participation
in specific operations will remain a sov-
ereign decision of member states in accord-
ance with national constitutions. "
85. At their meeting in June 1994, the military
delegates agreed that a military Command and
Control Working Group (CCWG) chaired by the
Planning Cell, would carry out a study on the
details of the interface between the WEU Council
and the Operations Commander. In one of the
conclusions of this study, a recommendation was
made to establish a new Politico-Military Group
in support of the Council, a Situation Centre and
an Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell.
86. At its Lisbon meeting in May 1995, the
Council decided to establish the structures recom-
mended in the abovementioned study.
87. A comprehensive review of the various
other elements of the WEU politico-military
structure is given in the following paragraphs.
(a) The Situation Centre
88. The purpose of the Situation Cenfre, loca-
ted in WEU headquarters in Brussels, is to enable
the Council to monitor and control a WEU oper-
ation in any theatre on the basis of real-time infor-
mation on its development.
89. The general mission of the Situation Centre
is to monitor the situation in crisis areas designa-
ted by the Council, as well as the progress of
WEU operations, and to produce the information
required for the Politico-Military Group's prepa-
ration of Council decisions on crisis management
and the politico-military control of operations. It
does not give assessments or prepare recommen-
dations.
90. All member stares agree that this mission
includes the following general tasks:
- 
in cooperation with the Planning Cell's
Intelligence Section, monitor any crisis
designated by the Council and support
the Politico-Military Group in the formu-
lation of its initial assessment;
- 
provide an overview ofthe situation for
the Planning Cell, to facilitate the perfor-
mance of its tasks;
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provide facilities for communications
between the Operations Commander and
the Council-designated " Point of
Contact " and ensure continuity for the
benefit of the Point of contact;
monitor the progress of the operation, in
liaison with the designated operation
headquarters, and provide the Council
and the Politico-Military Group with
concise but fuIl information;
provide support to the Politico-Military
Group in the conduct of other tasks rela-
ted to WEU operations.
91. A rudimentary form of Situation Centre
was set up in time for Crisex 95-96, Phase I, in
December 1995.
92. The Centre is expected to be fully operatio-
nal by the end of June 1996, when it will operate
in the framework of Crisex 95-96, Phase tr. [n
peacetime there will be a staff of five running the
Centre. The Situation Cenffe is a WEU organ in
its own right, answerable to the Secretary-General
of WEU.
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93. ln the diagram, the Situation Centre comes
under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-
General of WEU and is not part of the Planning
Cell.
94. As discussed in paragraph 61 of the present
report, a decision has still to be taken as to who
should serve as the point of contact between the
operational headquarters of a WEU operation and
the Council. It seems that this choice cannot be
made until different solutions have been tested in
the framework of Crisex 95-96, Phases II and III.
(b) The Intelligence Sectian
95. The Intelligence Section in the Planning
Cell started its work in September 1995 and now
has a staff of six, including the chief officer.
96. Seven member states are at present provid-
ing intelligence on a voluntary basis.
97. The work and further development of the
Inteltgence Section are discussed in the report on
" A European intelligence policy " submitted by
Mr Baumeltr.
(c ) Op e ralio nal c ommunic alio ns
98. Much attention is being paid to the estab-
lishment of an operational communications net-
work and infrastructure. This is considered vital,
among other things for secure communications
between the WEU Council and the operational
headquarters of a WEU operation.
99. WEU has signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with NATO on a communications
network, but this cannot take effect before the
conclusion of a security agreement between WEU
and NATO 
- 
a first priority for the WEU military 
-
which is expected to take place in June 1996.
(d) Rules of engagement
100. The establishment of WEU rules of engage-
ment also hinges on this security agreement bet-
ween WEU and NATO.In fact, WEU's objective
is to use and apply the same rules of engagement
as NATO. Understandably NAIO, which in prin-
ciple can agree to this objective, is reluctant to
provide the documents concerned because there is
no guarantee as to their protection as long as there
is no WEU-NATO security agreement.
(e) Exercise polity
101. Petersberg missions are a new phenomenon
for many WEU forces and there is a need to prac-
11. " A European intelligence policy ", report submitted on
behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Baumel, Rapporteur,
Document 1517.
tise these new tasks with different formations in
field exercises. At the top end, decision-making
exercises should be perforrned at least once a year
involving the Council, military headquarters and
operational commun i cations.
102. The Planning Cell has completed a docu-
ment on a future WEU exercise policy. An exer-
cise programme is being developed, making
active use of exercises which have been proposed
by member states in order to circumvent the time-
consuming problem of drafting and designing
exercises from scratch, which would cause a few
years' delay. A coherent exercise programure is
now being developed, extending to the year 2000.
103. ln order to test WEU's crisis-management
instruments from the planning of a WEU opera-
tion to the implementation of the operation in a
specific crisis area, WEU is now implementing
the Crisex 95-96 exercise in three phases. The
general framework of the exercise is a peace-
keeping operation in accordance with Chapter M
of the United Nations Charter.
lM. Phase I, which took place on 15-21 Decem-
ber 1995, concerned decision-making and proce-
dural mechanisms inside WEU and between the
WEU headquarters and the capitals.
105. Phase II, which will take place in June
1996, will test cooperation between WEU deci-
sion-making bodies, capitals and an operational
headquarters in France.
106. Phase III, planned for December 1996, will
test cooperation between operational headquar-
ters and field headquarters.
107. It should be noted that in the meantime
France, Italy and Spain are continuing their com-
mon exercise prograrnme which they have clearly
associated with WEU and the operational develop
ment of a European defence identity. After the
" Farfadet 92 ", " Ardente 93 " and " Tramon-
tana94" exercises, 1996 sees "Eolo 96". This
exercise, with a total of 7 000 troops in a multi-ser-
vice configuration, will simulate a peacekeeping
operation mounted by a multinational force. This
force will have to resist hostile activities and guar-
antee security and freedom of movement for itself
and for civilians belonging to both sides in the
conflict. EUROMARFOR, the quadrilateral mari-
time force (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain),
which is also a declared EAWEU, has participated
in this exercise as its first operational activity.
$) Politito-Military Group (PMG)
108. At their meeting in Noordwijk on 14
November 1 994, ministers considered:
" that the Council needs to have appro-
priate information and consultation mecha-
nisms and procedures and more support, in
T4
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particular to enable prompt reactions to
irises, inter alia through a politico-military
working group in Brussels which can be
reinforCed as necessary according to the
specific nature ofthe contingency. "
They further said that:
" The support capacities of the Secretariat in
the politico-military field need to be reinfor-
ced accordingly so that the Secretariat can
fully support the work done by the Council
andits politico-military working group. "
109. As a consequence of Council decisions
taken in Lisbon, in May lgg5,aPolitico-Military
Group was established in order to discuss current
politiio-military affairs. ffis group has no_w draf-
ied a basic document on the future role of WEU in
humanitarian operations. It has also done impor-
tant work for the enhancement of WEU's opera-
tional capabilities, in particular with regard-to the
establishhent of a Situation Centre and an lntelli-
gence Section in the Planning Cell. The Politico-
Mititary Group has also been instrumental in dis-
cussing a number of important issues regar{ing
WEU operations in former Yugoslavia and their
adaptation to the consequences of the Dayton
Accords.
110. It should be noted that in the relatively
short period of its existence, the Politico-Military
Grouf has become an important forum which is
playing a substantial role in preparing_the essen-
tial discussions and decisions of the Council. In
fact, this group has also partly taken over the role
of the military-delegates in the earlierWEU confi-
guration.
@) Politbo-Mililery WorHng Group (PMWG)
111. In the second half of 1994, the Council
agreed on the text of the terms of reference for a
Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG) which
is operating under the Council's authority as part
of the follow-up to the Luxembourg Declaration
and to the NATO summit meeting in Brussels.
ll2. The PMWG has been instrumental in draf-
ting a document on criteria and arrangements for
the effective use of CJTF by WEU. In this frame-
work, it has also drafted a document on mechan-
isms and procedures for WEU use of Alliance
assets and capabilities as well as a report on assets
and capabilities required for WEU operations.
(h) Command and control
113. At ttreir meeting in June 1994,the military
delegates agteed that a military Command and
ConEol Working Group (CCWG), chaired by the
Planning Cell, would carry out a study on the
details of the interface between the WEU Council
and the Operations Commander.
(i) Procedures lor the ileplayment offorces
inaWEU operalian
ll4. In the light of the preceding review of the
existing politico-military structures in WEU, it
seems useful to summarise below the procedures
for setting up a WEU operation.
115. In a crisis situation, as soon as the Council
takes the decision that FAWEU may have to be
deployed in order to implement one of the Peters-
berg tasks, it asks the Planning Cell to draft a
contingency plan with a possible force package,
drawing on the generic planning available.
116. On the basis of a contingency plan, the
Planning Cell will then use the force generation
request procedure in order to ask the various cate-
goiies of states participating in WEU which
forces, on the basis ofproposed force packages in
the contingency plan, would be available for this
specific mission. After receiving their replies, the
Planning Cell will present a final version of its
contingency plan to the WEU Council.
ll7. The Council will then have to give final
approval to go ahead with the operation,_nominate
an operations commander who will draft an oper-
ations plan and designate a headquarters. This
may be the national headquarters of one of the
member states or the operational headquarters of
multinational FAWEU. At WEU, it is thought that
this solution would be more flexible and efflcient
than establishing one permanent multinational
WEU headquarters. The chain of command in
such operatibns flows from the Council via the
point of contact to the operations commander and
eventually the force commander. The operations
commander is in command of the operation in
accordance with the abovementioned procedure,
but it is to be noted that each member state will
always retain ultimate control over troops they
have put at the disposal of WEU for a specific
operation.
118. Meanwhile, satisfactory araangements have
been worked out to ensure efficient coordination
in the theatre of operations between the military
and civilian elements of an operation, in particular
where the civilian elements are provided by an-
other organisation such as the United Nations.
IX. Positinn of associate Partners
119. It should be recalled here that in the docu-
ment on " A status of association with WEU for
the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the
Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the
Republic of Latvia, the Republic oflithuania, the
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Romania and
the Slovak Republic ", adopted on 9 May 1994,
the following documents were established in
connection with associate partner status:
15
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" 1. They may participate in the meetings
of the Council subject to the following
provisions:
- 
they may take part in discussions but
may not block a decision that is the
subject of consensus among the
member states;
- 
to enable WEU to perform to rhe full
its role as the defence component of
the European Union and as the
means to strengthen the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and
also to address any other questions
in an appropriate configuration,
meetings of the Council according
to present arrangements will be
convened on the basis of the provi-
sions agreed in Rome on 20 Novem-
ber L992 in the Document on Asso-
ciate Membership of WEU and the
Declaration on WEU Observers.
They will be regularly informed at the
Council of the activities of its working
groups and may be invited to partici-
pate in working groups on a case-by-
case basis.
They may have a liaison arangement
with the Planning Cell.
2. They may associate themselves with
decisions taken by member states
concerning the following tasks envis-
aged in paragraph II.4 of the Peters-
berg Declaration, i.e.'humanitarian
and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks,
tasks of combat forces in crisis mana-
gement, including peacemaking'.
They will be able to participate in their
implementation as well as in relevant
exercises and planning unless a maj-
ority of the member states, or half of
the member states including the Presi-
dency, decide otherwise. They will be
invited to provide information on
forces. They will also be able to offer
forces for specific operations.
When it is agreed that rhey join such
WEU operations by committing forces,
they will have the same obligations as
other participants, as well as the right
of involvement in the command struc-
tures and in the Council's subsequent
decision-making process. The precise
msdalities of their participation, inclu-
ding their rights and obligations, in
each such WEU operation will be
agreed on a case-by-case basis ".
l2O. From the abovementionedo especially as
regards the operational side of WEU, it can be
concluded that once the Council has taken a deci-
sion to mount a Petersberg operation, associate
partners can participate in the implementation of
this decision unless a majority bf the member
states, or half the member states includins the Pres-
idency, decide otherwise. Once it is a[reed that
they may participate in an operation by commit-
ting forces, they have rights and obligaiions simi-
lar to otherparticipants. The precise arrangements
for participation are agreed on a case--by-case
basis. An informal arrangement has now been
established aimed at informing associate parmers
about developments in the Plahning Cell's activi-
ties. If required, bi- or multilateral consultations
can take place berween the Planning Cell and the
associate parmers.
l2l. The associate partners have been invited to
provide details of forces they consider suitable for
participation in humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in
crisis management, including peacemaking. Such
units have now been designattiJ and will bE taken
into consideration alongside the FAWEU list. Fur-
thermore, if the associate partners participate in
any gf the abovementioned operatiohs, they will,
together with the other participating states in that
lperation, define the practical arrangements for
the conduct of such operations.
L22. To date, no security agreement has been
concluded between WEU and the associate part-
ners and, as a consequence, associate partners do
not receive any information which carries a confi-
d_ential or higher classification. It is no surprise that
the conclusion of the WEU-NATO security agree-
ment has taken such a long time in view of-the par-
ticipation of associate partners in WEU activiti-es.
123. The IFOR operation in Bosnia, in which the
9?9"h Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,Lithuania and Poland are participating in their
role as as_sociate partners, is considered an impor-
tant test-bed for cooperation with associate part-
ners in possible future WEU operations. Assoc-
iate partners also cooperated actively in drafting
the document o'European security: a common
concept of the 27 WEU countries ".
124. At its Madrid meeting, the Council wel-
comed.the plo$ess made with regard to imple-
mentation of the liaison {urangements between
associate partners and the Planning Cell. Minis-
ters agreed that, on the basis of the common
ground developed in joint reflections on the new
European security conditions and within the
context of llteir present status, the associate part-
ners should be more involved in the ongoing work
on developing the operational role of WEU with
regard to Petersberg missions. They tasked the
Permanent Council to give priority-to the ways
and means of achieving this objective.
125. 
^ 
Atthis stage, a serious effort is being made
to inform associate partners as thoroughly as pos-
t6
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sible about the activities of the Planning Cell
without involving them directly in its work, which
would jeopardise the future security agreement
between WEU and NATO.
X. Euroffi
126. For a number of years, especially in the
wake of the Gulf war, the Assembly of WEU has
attached great importance to the establishment of
independent European strategic mobility. A bilat-
eral Franco-German post-Gulf war study on Euro-
pean requirements for strategrg mobili_$t was not
-given 
any follow-up until the Council decided on
2l lpr;it 1993 that, under the aegis of the Planning
Cell,-a WEU strategic mobility study should be
initiated.
127. A WEU strategic mobility working group
started work in the second half of 1993. Follow-
ing an evaluation of existing sffategic mobility
capabilities in WEU in Phase I, which was prqs-
enled to the Ministers in November L994, the
working group has now concluded its work on
Phase [, which includes a WEU strategic mobil-
ity concept, and will submit its study to the Coun-
cil for approval in May 1996.
128. In the strategic mobility concept, consensus
has been reached on the principle of coordinating
national assets. The concept establishes coordina-
tion measures and procedures for the pooling of
national transport assets and for circumstances
where WEU would have to have recourse to the
civil transport market, in particular to avoid com-
petitive bidding. There have been proposals for
the Planning Cell to be the coordinating authority,
but membeistates consider sffategic lift a national
responsibility which can only be coordinated on
an 
-ad 
hoc baiis. The Planning Cell could certainly
provide help in that context, but once the Council
iecided to initiate a military operation, coordina-
tion, including national sffategic lift assets, would
be in the hands of the operations commander.
XI. A European nuclear detenent?
129. On several occasions in the past, the
Assembly of WEU has discussed the role of
nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe.
130. The Council has almost consistently
dodged recommendations to discuss the role of
nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe'
131. Concluding a report on " WEIJ: the oper-
ational organisatibn ", the Assembly in June 1992
recommended that the Council:
" Encourage France and the United King-
dom, in cobperation if possible, tp maintain
an effective and credible minimukn nuclear
deterrent and, in parallel, consider the des-
irability of instituting a WEU o'nuclear
consultation group'o to give practical
expression to the principles of nuclear
deterrence reiterated in The Hague Plat-
form as well as helping to define a Euro-
pean opinion on nuclear disarmament and
anti-proliferation measures. " 12.
132. The Council replied dryly:
" Questions pertaining to the 'o mainte-
nance of an effective and credible mini-
mum nuclear deterrent " and to the desira-
bility of instituting a WEU o'nuclear
consultation group " are not at present on
the agenda of the Council and its working
groups " ".
133. When in Recommendation 540'4 the
Assembly recommended that the Council:
" Re-examine the role of both United States
and European nuclear weapons in Euro-
pean security in conjunction with a parallel
ie-examination in the framework of the
Atlantic Alliance;"
the Council replied that it again took note of the
Assembly's recommendation, this time more
generally, pointing out that 'o nuclear questions
are not at piesent on the agenda of the Council or
its working groups '015. [n 1994, the Assembly,
convinced that sooner or later the role of nuclear
weapons in Europe and in a European defence
policy would have to be discussed, adopted an
extensive recommendation on the role and future
of nuclear weapons 16.
134. In particular, the Assembly recommended
that the Council:
" Establish a strategic study group within
WEU:
- 
to examine the role and future of nuclear
weapons for European security including
the different aspects of intra-European
extended nuclear deterrence;
- 
to examine the role all the WEU member
states might play in defining a future
European nuclear strategy ;
- 
then to study the possibility of creating a
nuclear coordination body within WEU. "
135. In its reply, the Council did not comment
on these specific recommendations, but instead
delivered a banage of platitudes such as 'o under
the present circumstances there is for European
12. Recommendation 518, adopted onZ Jrulae 1992.
13. Communicated to the Assembly on 16 October 1992.
14. Adopted on 15 June 1993.
15. Communicated to the Assembly on 14 October 1993.
16. Recommendation 564, adopted on 16 June 1994.
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defence, for the foreseeable future, no alternative
for a strategy ... based on conventional and
nuclear weapons " and " nuclear weapons make a
unique contribution in rendering the risks of any
aggression incalculable and unacceptable ".
136. It also quoted NATO's new strategic
concept of 1991, which recognised that " the inde-
pendlnt nuclear forces of the United Kingdom
and France, which have a deterrent role of their
own, contribute to the overall deterrence and
security of the Allies ".
137. In the document " European security: a
common concept of the 27 WEU countries "
adopted by the Council on 14 November 1995,
one paragraph discussed the " Role of nuclear
forces in deterrence ". Disappointingly, even this
single paragraph did virtually no moie than repeat
hackneyed phrases from the 1987 Hague Platfbrrn
and the 1991 new strategic concept of the
Alliance. It also repeated a phrase from the prelim-
inary conclusions on the formulation of a com-
mon European defence policy of June 1994 accor-
diqg to which " Europeans have a major responsi-bility with regard to defence in both the
conventional and nuclear field ". As could have
been expected, Austria, Finland,Ireland and Swe-
den, recalled in a footnote that they were not party
to these decisions.
138. One seriously wonders what use it is to
state that "Europeans have a major responsibility
with regard to defence in ... the nuclear field " ii
no further explanation is forthcoming.
139. After resuming its nuclear tests, France
proposed that its European partners, in the frame-
work of instituting a common defence, think
about the availability of its nuclear deterrent
forces. President Chirac suggested on 3l August
1995 that: " As it builds up its defence, the Euro-
pean Union might wish the French deterrent to
play a role in that defence". Latet, the Prime
Minister, Mr Jupp6, added that cooperation in
defence questions could no longer overlook the
nuclear dimension of Europe's common security.
The proposal to start discussing the possibility of
a concerted European nuclear deterrent was in
particular directed at the United Kingdom and
Germany.
140. Against the background of the French
nuclear tests then taking place, it is understand-
able that the German Government reacted politely
and diplomatically. Among other things, the Gei-
man Minister for Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel,
stated that the idea of concerted deterrence was
interesting and should be discussed and studied
closely. He also.said that after the end of the tests,
Germany would be prepared to re-examine the
status of French and British deterrent forces in
order to facilitate the creation of a European
defence identity and give it credibility.
L4l. The United Kingdom, being itself one of
the official nuclear weapon states, has no prob-
lem in discussing nuclear issues with France.
Since 1992, a Joint Commission on Nuclear
Policy and Doctrine established by France and
the United Kingdom has proved to be a useful
instrument in improving ielations between the
two countries in military nuclear matters. On the
other hand, Prime Minister John Major declared
that the United Kingdom does not see any roomfor a new deterrent organisation in Europe
outside NATO'?.
142. It should be noted, however, that it is
increasingly unlikely that, within the framework
of a common European security and defence
policy, nuclear forces would be an asset for the
defence and security of the national territory of
only one specific coirnnry.
143. Other serious considerations when discus-
sing the possibility and role of a concerted Euro-
pean deterrent are the position of those central
European states that are now associate partners of
t{EU 
-l the changes in European security that
will result from selective enlargement of NafO.
Will the new NAIO member states be protected
unconditionally by NATO's, i.e. the United
States', nuclear umbrella? What security arrange-
ments q4t 
_Ug agreed for those cenfral'European
stateswhieh, havqteen selected for future E-uro-
pean 
-Union membership but which, as regards
se^gurity, will be left in the cold after enlargunent
of NATO to take in only Poland, the CzechR.epub-
lic and Hungary?
14. In the end, an adequate discussion of Euro-
pean possession of nuclear weapons, their stnrc-
ture and their tasks, is only possible if there is
common agreement on why nuclear weapons
should remain available now that the East-West
conflict has ended. Apart from this, it must be
clear into which security and defencepolitical frame-
work they should be inserted. On this framework
will depend whether WEU's operational capabili-
ti9-s can be organised in a purposeful, rational and
effective way.
145. Therefore, but also for basic political consid-
erations, it must be made clear sooh what specific
shape European security architecture is to take.
This presupposes that the institutional links bet-
ween WEU and the EU, and between the EU,s
common foreign and security policy and NATO,
be determined. When taking this decision,
account must be taken of the fact that some cen-
tral European states have decided, in accordance
with the rules of self-determination and demo-
cracy, that they wish to become members of the
EU and NATO.
17. Iz Monde,29-30 October 1995.
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L46. As regards the creation of the future Euro-
pean security architecture, decisions of the EU,
NATO and WEU, as well as recommendations of
the European Commission exist:
- 
" Resolved to implement a common
foreign and security policy including the
eventual framing of a common defence
policy which might in time lead to a
common defence. " (Preamble to the
Treaty on European Union, 7 February
1992)
- 
* In accordance with the decision con-
tained in the Declaration of member states
of WEU at Maasticht on 10 December
1991 to develop WEU as the defence
component of the Ernopean Union and as
the means to strengthen the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. " @eters-
berg Declaration, 19 June lD2)
- 
" The enlargement of NATO is a parallel
process with and will complement that of
the European Union. " INATO: study on
NATO enlargement, September 1995)
- 
" Parallel processes of enlargement of
EU, WEU and NATO are desirable and
would alleviate the complexities connec-
ted with differing memberships of these
organisations. " (Communiqu6 of the
WEU Council, Madrid, 14 November
199s)
- 
" The majority view equally shares the
desire to make maximum use of the exis-
ting treaty provisions for operational
reinforcement of the ESDI and streng-
thening of cooperation between the EU,
WEU and NA[O, but, in addition to thiso
advocates the gradual integration of
WEU into EU with thepurpose of achiev-
ing greater coherence than at present of
European action in the security and
defence field. " (Madrid, 14 November
1995)
- 
" The (intergovernmental) conference
should therefore evaluate the task of
WEU with regard to its integration in the
Union according to a fixed time sched-
ule. " (European Commission: Opinion
of the Commission: Reinforcement of
the political union and preparation of its
enlargement, Brussels, 28 February
r996).
147. Within WEU Europeans can no longer
afford to ignore the issue of nuclear deterrence
even if they are at present 
- 
a convenient qualifier
used by the Council 
- 
not rgady to psta.blish A
European nuclear deterrent. Nuclbar deterrence is
playing a role in the defence security of Europe
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable
future, whether one likes it or not. If WEU consi-
ders itself to be a defence and security organisa-
tion, it should at least start to include the issue of
the role of nuclear weapons in its discussions,
unless it can prove that in security and defence
matters, nothing will ever change.
XIL Conclusbns
148. Contrary to what was hoped and expected
at the time of German reuffication, the present-
day world, Europe included, has not become a
place where threats to security, such as armed
coffict, ethnic sEife and even genocide, can be
relegated to the annals ofhistory.
L49. On the other hand, it is encouraging to see
that an increasing number, if not all, European
states consider the European unffication process
as the only viable course for the future and the
best guarantee for security on the continent. But
although this is beyond doubt, there is still a long
way to go before the final objective will be
attained.
150. Meanwhile, Europe will have to muddle
through a period in which the EU, WEU and
NAIO will coexist with different memberships.
For some time to come, not all European coun-
tries will be covered by the same security blanket
or protected by the same socio-economic safety
net. In some parts of Europe the possibility of
regional conflicts cannot be excluded and the Uni-
ted States has made it sufficiently clear that it is
not planning to play the role of fire-fighter or
peace-keeper in any such conflicts if they erupt.
151. Therefore most European governments, and
in particular the member states of WEU, agree that
there is a need to develop a specific European
security capacity, not competing with, but comple-
mentary to NAf,O. Experience in Bosniahas made
this requirement even more pressing.
152. After finalisation of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union in December 1991, the WEU Council
established a new basis for the development of
WEU's role in the security of Europe, including
the strengthening of its operational role, in its
Petersberg Declaration of June 1992.
153. In bygone years the Assembly has often
criticised the Council for its inertia, lack of politi-
cal will and courage, delaying tactics and protrac-
ted debates on institutional matters. The present
report, however, provides an opportunity to pay
tribute to the Council for what it has achieved in
enhancing WEU's operational capabilities. Appar-
ently, years of dogged work behind the scenes and
the pragmatis fopus of the Bntish hpsidenpy havc
paid off.
I54. The long-awaited basic politico-military
infrastructure for the conduct and the command
t9
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and conffol of WEU military operations has now
been established.
A Politico-Military Group has been set up to sup-
port the Council and help it to react promptly to
crises. The Planning Cell's staffhas been enlarged
and it has been reinforced with a modest Intelli-
gence Section. From the end ofJune, an operatio-
nal Situation Centre in WEU headquarters will be
able to monitor the situation in crisis areas as well
as the progress of WEU operations. Clear chan-
nels of communication between the WEU Coun-
cil and WEU forces are guaranteed, and a single
chain of command for all WEU military forces
involved in an operation has been established.
Arrangements have been made to ensure efficient
coordination between military and civilian ele-
ments in the theatre of operations.
155. The Planning Cell has at its disposal a fuIl
and updated list of forces answerable to WEU,
units and combinations of units of member states
which could be allocated to WEU for specific
operations. A separate list includes units which
associate members, associate parhers and obser-
vers would assign to such operations. The machin-
ery and procedures for the rapid creation and
assembly of a WEU force in times of crisis have
been defined. Generic planning for humanitarian
crises, including a full array of force packages,
has now been completed.
156. Finally, a security agreement between
WEU and NATO has been concluded making pro-
vision for the exchange of intelligence data, the
use of an operational communications network
and the establishment of WEU rules of engage-
ment. The endorsement of an agreement conclud-
ed on Combined Joint Task Forces by the North
Atlantic Council in June 1996 will enable WEU to
use NAIO collective assets and capabilities in a
European-led operation where the United States
chooses not to participate.
157. Not all the work has been done yet, and
much attention needs to be paid to the strength-
ening of WEU's operational capabilities in such
fields as reconnaissance and intelligence, strate-
gic and in-theatre transport capabilities, 4ad sran-
dardisation and interoperability. European coop-
eration on defence equipment and the
maintenance of a European defence industrial
base are other areas requiring careful study. The
conclusion of the CJTF agreement, however, will
enable WEU to make good these shortcomings for
the time being. The tools for WEU operations are
available 
- 
it is now up to the Councilto use them,
ifneed be.
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